Based on high level safety and cost requirements, system architects and subsystem engineers are called upon to provide requirements at a lower level during the conceptual design phase of a Reusable Launch Vehicle (RLV). This paper describes an event tree based methodology for quantitatively assessing the limits of some of the lower-level Integrated Vehicle Health Management (IVHM) requirements during RLV conceptual design. The metrics assessed in the paper are fault detection coverage, false alarm probability, fault isolation capability, probability of IVHM failing to detect a fault, and safety allocation. The fault detection and isolation metrics were assessed based on their applicability with respect to cost and safety in the mission and turnaround phase of the RLV operations. The paper shows that the mission-phase requirement for IVHM fault detection coverage for a subsystem is large (more stringent) when IVHM needs to make the subsystem safer, the failure remediation probability is small, and the subsystem is already reliable. The requirement on IVHM false alarm rate in the mission phase is small (more stringent) when the subsystem is reliable, IVHM needs to make the subsystem safer, and IVHM should cause fewer false aborts.
INTRODUCTION
National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA's) strategic goals for the next generation RLV are to reduce the risk of crew loss to approximately 1 in 10,000 missions and to lower the cost of delivering payloads to lowEarth orbit to less than $1,000 per pound (Ref. 1) . NASA is employing systems engineering and integration methodology to ensure that NASA's investment contributes significantly to its overall goals of greater safety and lower costs. During the systems engineering process, architectures are generated to better describe and understand the system. The architecture is a detailed description of how the subsystems join together to form the system. Specifically, the architecture is an integrated set of elements of the RLV including the earth-to-orbit launch vehicles, on-orbit transfer vehicles and upper stages, mission planning, ground and flight operations, and ground-based and on-orbit-based support infrastructure. Systems analysis is being used continually to assess the progress toward the program's safety and cost goals.
One of NASA's technology development areas is IVHM. IVHM is an advanced form of the traditional vehicle instrumentation system. The IVHM system goes a few steps further by providing the capability to process data into information and to integrate the information about the health of a RLV into all aspects of system operation. This enables users to make informed decisions and take appropriate actions to ensure the success of the mission (Refs. [2] [3] .
IVHM will prevent and/or manage faults during both mission and turnaround phases of the RLV operations. It can be applied at the system, subsystem, component, and ground systems levels. The specific solution is determined by the requirements for each application. The key IVHM benefits are reduced processing time, manpower, and cost during the turnaround phase; increased safety and reliability in all phases; and increased system availability. Additional benefits of IVHM are in reducing redundancy during the design phase and reducing the number of false alarms. Thus, implementation of IVHM technologies in a RLV will affect both safety and economics -two of the key goals for NASA.
Many of the IVHM technologies are only at a conceptual design formulation stage (low technology readiness). The decisions about including some or all of the IVHM technologies in the RLV architecture will be made in the near future with the RLV designs at a conceptual stage. It is well known that conceptual design has a significant influence on product development. Previous studies (Refs. [4] [5] have shown that 65-70% of life cycle cost is locked into the design by the end of the concept design phase. Similarly, it is likely that a significant portion of the safety of an RLV is decided by concept design. Thus, it is important to consider the influence of conceptual design requirements on the economics and safety of a RLV, especially, with respect to new technologies (IVHM-related or otherwise).
This paper describes an event tree (Ref. 6) based methodology for quantitatively assessing some of the IVHM requirements during RLV conceptual design. The simplified event trees used in this paper are appropriate for conceptual design. The metrics assessed in this paper are fault detection coverage, false alarm probability, fault isolation capability, probability of IVHM failing to detect a fault, and safety allocation. A review of the published literature did not show any existing methodologies for quantifying these IVHM metrics during conceptual design of a RLV. subsystem 's'. LT = Lost time due to a LOV or LOM (depending on the context). The value of LT for LOV may be different from its value for a LOM. n = Number of maintenance cycles per year for one RLV. N = Number of years in the RLV's life cycle. P d = Probability of IVHM detecting a fault in subsystem 's' = F d ·(1-P i ). P fa = IVHM false alarm rate for subsystem 's' (false positive). P fd = Probability of a false IVHM fault detection in subsystem 's' = F d ·P fa . P ft = Non-IVHM maintenance test false alarm rate for subsystem 's'. P i = Probability of IVHM failure to detect a fault in subsystem 's' that the IVHM is designed to detect (false negative). P n = Probability of a normal mission as a result of remediation action. P r = Probability of a remediation action taken as a result of IVHM's fault detection in subsystem 's'. P s = Probability of a fault in subsystem 's' which will result in a LOV, or LOM, or LOV/LOM/LOP (depending on the context). The value of P s will be different in each of these contexts. P t = Probability of non-IVHM maintenance test failing to detect a fault in subsystem 's' that it is designed to detect. PLOM m = Probability of a LOM during mission phase but not considering subsystem 's'. PLOV a = Probability of a LOV during abort phase but not considering subsystem 's'. PLOV m = Probability of a LOV during mission phase but not considering subsystem 's'. RT = Average retest time. 
Definitions
Fault Detection Coverage is defined as the percentage of detected faults with respect to the total number of known faults.
Fault Isolation Coverage is the percentage of faults that will be correctly isolated to the recoverable interface given that a fault has occurred and has been detected.
False Alarm Rate is defined as the ratio of false alarms (alarms that have no identifiable anomaly/fault/failure associated with them) to the total number of alarms.
Probability of IVHM failing to detect a fault is the probability that an alarm is not triggered, or a rule is not fired, but the actual system behavior is indicating that there is a fault or a developing failure.
RLV TURNAROUND PHASE
The turnaround phase for the RLV is the time between missions. During this phase the RLV is brought to a safe state, maintenance is performed, refilled with propellants, and loaded with crew or payload. In this section, the RLV total maintenance costs for subsystem 's', with and without IVHM, are compared to each other to derive the maintenance-related requirements.
Assumptions

Total costs consist of the turnaround maintenance costs
and the DDT&E costs. The costs related to the nonmaintenance, turnaround-phase activities are assumed to be the same for both, with and without IVHM, and are not developed in the analysis. 2. Turnaround maintenance cost for subsystem 's' is proportional to the testing times and scheduled and unscheduled maintenance times during a turnaround. RAMS 2004 -486 -U.S. Government work not protected by U.S. copyright
, is a function of the IVHM fault detection coverage F d . 6. To make an appropriate comparison, the DDT&E costs are distributed uniformly using a discount factor (d) for an annual number of maintenance periods (n) over the RLV's life cycle (N). So, for each turnaround phase the DDT&E cost is apportioned as
The latter term is obtained from the capital recovery cost equation (Ref. 7) using an investment of C d (F d ) with the asset being used over n·N periods and an interest rate per period of (d/n). 7. Ground maintenance retests are 100% reliable. 8. A positive indication of a fault is not caused by an unmonitored condition or failure.
Baseline Case -Subsystem 's' without IVHM
As there is no IVHM, all the scheduled non-IVHM tests will be done during turnaround maintenance of subsystem 's'. So, there is a baseline scheduled maintenance time of ST. In addition, because of potential faults in subsystem 's' there may be additional unscheduled maintenance times. These are shown in the event tree of Figure 1 . Without loss of generality, let's assume that scheduled maintenance tests for faults related to LOV, LOM, or LOP (LOV/LOM/LOP). The event tree of Figure 1 considers faults in a subsystem 's' that is tested in the turnaround phase. The consequences in the event tree are expressed in terms of test and unscheduled maintenance times. 
Alternative case -Subsystem 's' with IVHM
The addition of IVHM to subsystem 's' is associated with: (1-F d ) .
The event tree of Figure 2 starts with the same faults as in the baseline case. However, because of the addition of IVHM in subsystem 's' there may be additional unscheduled maintenance times, and these are also assessed in the event tree. The consequences in the event tree are expressed in terms of test and unscheduled maintenance times.
Based on unscheduled maintenance times of Figure 2 , scheduled maintenance times, and time-equivalent of IVHM DDT&E costs, Average total turnaround cost of subsystem 's' with IVHM 
Comparison of Baseline and Alternative Turnaround Costs
The alternative case, with IVHM, will be preferred over the baseline when the average turnaround cost with IVHM, eq (2), is smaller than the average turnaround cost without IVHM, eq (1). Using the approximations P t <<1 and P i <<1, and assuming LT > RT, sufficient conditions for the 
The necessary and sufficient condition for the alternative case to be preferred over the baseline case is that the value of eq (2) is smaller than the value of eq (1). The conditions of eq (3) guarantee the alternative case turnaround cost of eq (2) to be smaller than the baseline case turnaround cost of eq (1), and so these conditions are sufficient. These conditions are not necessary because there exists other conditions, conditions other than eq (3), where eq (2) is smaller than eq (1). Hence, conditions of eq (3) are useful for setting the requirements at conceptual analysis.
During conceptual design, the values for assessing equation set (3) are known only approximately and so the limits derived for the IVHM parameters will only be estimates. Equation set (3) can be interpreted as the following IVHM requirements for subsystem 's': 1. Reduction in scheduled test time due to the introduction of IVHM should be larger than increase in time for maintenance of the IVHM system and the time-equivalent to its DDT&E cost. So, the IVHM fault detection coverage requirements should be determined by a system analysis and optimization with respect to the non-IVHM tests that the IVHM will replace. A requirement for a specific percentage of IVHM fault detection coverage in conceptual design without system analysis and optimization may be economically counter-productive. 2. Unscheduled fault repair time with IVHM should be smaller than the unscheduled fault repair time using the tests that IVHM replaces. This may be accomplished by the better fault isolation capability of IVHM -the requirement for the level of IVHM fault isolation should be based on an analysis of the unscheduled fault repair times while comparing IVHM to non-IVHM tests. IVHM should provide maintenance recommendations for ground operations with supporting information in a relatively short amount of time. This will allow for an economically large reduction relative to non-IVHM test and maintenance times. 3. The requirement for IVHM false alarms should be that it is less than false alarms of the scheduled non-IVHM tests it replaces. 4. Probability of IVHM failing to detect a fault should be smaller than the failure probability of the scheduled non-IVHM test it replaces. There might be additional cost reductions of reducing critical path turnaround times, like increased revenue, but those benefits are not included in this methodology. Two notes of caution, (a) since these are only sufficient conditions, there may be other conditions for preferring IVHM, and (b) these design decisions and tradeoffs are best performed by the subsystem designers and should not be imposed in a top-down fashion by system engineers.
RLV MISSION PHASE
The mission phase for the RLV is the flight time between turnaround phases. In this section, the RLV probabilities of LOV and LOM due to failures in subsystem 's' are explored and compared for the two cases -with and without IVHM. Comparison between the two leads to the safety-related requirements.
Baseline case -Subsystem 's' without IVHM
The event tree of Figure 3 considers faults in a subsystem 's' which will result in a LOV. For some faults subsystem 's' may have successful corrective/remediation actions, the probability of those faults is excluded from P s . The consequences in the event tree are expressed in terms of mission outcome -continue with normal mission, or loss of vehicle. Based on Figure 3 , Probability LOV without IVHM sequences = P s ·1 + (1-P s )·PLOV m (4)
Alternative case -Subsystem 's' with IVHM
The addition of IVHM is associated with increased fault detection coverage, increased fault remediation, it's inherent false alarms, and it's inherent faults.
Considering the same faults as in the baseline case, the event tree of Figure 4 applies to the alternative case. The consequences in the event tree are expressed in terms of mission outcome -continue with normal mission, loss of vehicle, or abort/off-normal mission.
One event sequence needs additional explanation. The event sequence "No LOV fault, a false alarm due to IVHM, and no automatic remedial action" is assumed to have some action taken that will cause the RLV to have an abort or an off-normal mission. All other event sequences are selfexplanatory. Based on Figure 4 on the average for a subsystem 's', Probability LOV of IVHM sequences = P s + (1-
Safety Requirement Allocation to IVHM
During systems engineering of the conceptual RLV, it is possible that a safety requirement allocation (for LOV and LOM) has been made to the subsystem's IVHM. The specific instance when no safety requirement allocation case has been made is a subset of the general case.
The LOV allocation to IVHM for subsystem 's' is A v , and assuming that IVHM can achieve its safety allocation, Prob. LOV with IVHM = (1 -A v ) · Prob. LOV without IVHM A v is a fraction between 0 and 1. An A v value of 0 means that there is no requirement for the IVHM to reduce the LOV probability due to subsystem 's' failures, while an A v value of 1 means the requirement is to reduce the LOV probability to 0 when IVHM is included in subsystem 's'. The latter is a stringent requirement that is highly unlikely to be satisfied because failures in other systems also contribute to LOV and IVHM in one subsystem cannot eliminate all other system failures.
Comparison of Baseline and Alternative LOV Event Sequences
The alternative case, "with IVHM", will be preferred when it meets the LOV safety requirement allocation. That is,
(1 -A v ) · Prob. LOV without IVHM sequences ≥ Prob. LOV of IVHM sequences (6) "Prob. LOV without IVHM sequences" is obtained from the baseline case (eq (4)), while "Prob. LOV of IVHM sequences" is obtained from the alternative case (eq (5)). Substituting eqs (4)-(5) in eq (6); replacing P d = F d ·(1-P i ) and P fd = F d ·P fa ; and using PLOV a << 1, PLOV m << 1, P s << 1, P i << 1, P n ·(PLOV a -PLOV m ) << 1 for a RLV; and knowing that P fa ≥ 0 and 0 < F d ≤ 1; sufficient conditions for the alternative case to be preferred are:
Equation set (7) shows the limits for the IVHM requirements related to safety allocation, fault detection coverage, and false alarm rates for IVHM. These limits are all dependent on the subsystem 's'. During conceptual design, the values for assessing equation set (7) are known only approximately and so the limits derived for the IVHM parameters will only be estimates.
The IVHM system can support RLV safety allocations to the system and subsystem. The upper limit to the safety allocation is small, when the failure remediation probability is small. If there is no remediation action based on IVHM detection, then there is no reduction in LOV probability per mission. Remediation action can be a combination of autonomous determination and recovery; advisories for performance correction; or crew following procedures in response to a fault. Even with a remediation probability of 1, there is an upper limit to the improvement that IVHM can provide to any subsystem 's', and it is governed by the failure probabilities of the other subsystems (PLOV m ) and of subsystem 's' (P s ).
The minimum IVHM fault detection coverage requirement for LOV faults will be large (more stringent), when (a) LOV requirement allocation for IVHM is large, (b) Failure remediation probability is small, or (c) Subsystem 's' failure probability is small compared to mission LOV probability. A special case occurs when the LOV requirement allocation is zero (A v = 0). In that case, the lower limit of fault detection coverage is zero.
The upper limit on IVHM false alarm rate requirement is small (more stringent), when a) Subsystem 's' failure probability is small -the subsystem is reliable. b) LOV requirement allocation for IVHM is large -IVHM needs to make the subsystem safer. c) Abort LOV probability is large compared to mission LOV probability -IVHM should cause fewer false aborts. An interesting result is that if the abort LOV probability is the same as the mission LOV probability, then the upper limit for false alarm rate can be high from a LOV perspective (eq (7c)). This makes intuitive sense, because in this specific case a false alarm does not cause any increase in LOV probability. However in this case, the false alarm requirement should be lower from a LOM perspective. The LOM case is examined in the next section.
Comparison of Baseline and Alternative LOM Sequences
Using a methodology identical to LOV sequences, but focusing on LOM instead of LOV, sufficient conditions for "with IVHM" being preferred to "without IVHM" are:
The interpretation of these limits for the IVHM requirements related to LOM is similar to the interpretation for requirements related to LOV in the previous section.
In the previous section, an interesting result was obtained that if the abort LOV probability is the same as the mission LOV probability then the requirement for false alarm rate can be high from a LOV perspective (eq (7c)). However, the false alarm requirement is lower from a LOM perspective, since it is no longer dependent on the inverse of the difference between the abort and mission LOV probabilities (eq (8c) vs. eq (7c)).
DISCUSSION
During the conceptual design phase of a RLV, the higherlevel requirements are typically on cost and safety of the RLV. The IVHM requirements for fault detection coverage, false alarm probability, fault isolation capability, probability of IVHM failing to detect a fault, and safety allocation are lower level requirements.
Deriving appropriate lower level requirements is the task of system architects and subsystem engineers. This paper described an event tree based methodology for quantitatively assessing the limits of these lower level requirements. The IVHM requirements from a cost perspective were derived in the RLV turnaround phase section, while the requirements from a safety perspective were derived in the RLV mission phase section. The bounds on the requirements (equation sets (3), (7) , and (8)) provide the system architects and subsystem engineers with a feasible range for setting achievable IVHM requirements. For new technologies, like IVHM, where past experience is limited, a systems analysis methodology can provide valuable basis to supporting lower-level requirements.
Equations (1), (2), (4), and (5) can also be used to assess the changes to safety and cost for various IVHM alternatives. For the various alternatives, there will be different combinations of improvement in safety and cost from the baseline case. However, comparing the various IVHM alternatives leads to a safety vs. cost tradeoff. There are a number of multi-objective methodologies that can be used to assess this tradeoff, but they are beyond the scope of this paper.
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